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ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL HOME RULE AND URBAN LAND-
A TEST RUN OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION
ROBERT KRATOVIL*
JOHN T. ZIEGWEID**
RADITIONALLY, THROUGHOUT the United States, cities and towns
have been thought of as creatures of the state legislatures, and
have only been able to exercise those powers specifically enu-
merated and delegated to them. The trend today, however, is to re-
verse this concept by providing for Municipal Home Rule, whereby
the powers of local government bodies are construed liberally, sub-
ject only to specific legislative limitations or pre-emptions.
At present, home rule provisions have been adopted by over half
the states, at least eleven since 1950.1 This movement toward muni-
cipal home rule springs from a desire for local units of government,
governed by those intimately familiar with local problems and re-
sponsible to a local electorate, to enjoy the freedom to seek a solution
of purely local problems without interference from the legislature
and to cope with the immensely complex problems of urban life to-
day, especially those generated by the immense variety of the services
we expect of our municipalities.2 The doctrine of home rule was, in
the words of the Supreme Court of Ohio, "perhaps no better put
* Vice President, Chicago Title Insurance Co., J.D., DePaul Univeisity;
author of REAL ESTATE LAW (1972); MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE (1972).
** Legal Research Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Chicago Title
and Insurance Co.; A.B., Wabash College; J.D., ITT-Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. Moore, Local Government: Old Problems and a New Constitution, 33
MONT. L. REV. 154, 156 (1971); Vanlandingham, Symposium: Problems in Con-
stitutional Law-Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 269, 270 (1968).
2. Dyson, Ridding Home Rule of the Local Affairs Problem, 12 KAN. L. REV.
367 (1963-64); Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power under Home Rule: A
Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 644 (1964); Note, Conflicts Between
State and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REV. 737, 742 (1959); Note, Home
Rule: A Solution for Municipal Problems?, 16 Wyo. L.J. 47, 62 (1961). Inter-
estingly, the word "municipal" is a derivation of the Roman "municipium", mean-
ing a free city capable of governing its local affairs. 16 Wyo. L.J. at 49 (1961 ).
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than by Abraham Lincoln in 1859 in an address from the statehouse
front at Columbus, Ohio."3 Discussing the Douglas doctrine of pop-
ular sovereignity, Lincoln said:
I believe there is a genuine popular sovereignty. I think a definition of 'genuine
popular sovereignty,' in the abstract, would be about this: That each man shall do
precisely as he pleases with himself, and with all those things which exclusively
concern him. Applied to government, this principle would be that a general gov-
ernment shall do all those things which pertain to it, and all the local governments
shall do precisely as they please in respect to those matters which exclusively concern
them. I understand that this government of the United States, under which we live,
is based upon this principle; and I am misunderstood if it is supposed that I have any
war to make upon that principle.
4
Total municipal autonomy is manifestly impossible and probably
forbidden by constitutional restraints.5 Indeed, it would be a costly,
irrational and unworkable form of anarchy. Speaking in terms fa-
miiar to a property lawyer, it is obvious that each city or village can-
not be free to adopt its own statute of descent. This is a function
that belongs to the state. Nor should each city or village be free to
provide its own recording office. That function has been entrusted
by the state to the counties. It becomes immediately apparent that
a line-drawing process must take place in each state that adopts
municipal home rule.
To restate the problem in Lincoln's terms, if cities exercising home
rule powers may do precisely as they please, but only with respect to
matters which exclusively concern them, how are we to distinguish
matters which exclusively concern the city from those matters that
are of statewide concern or countywide concern? The unspoken in-
ference, in Lincoln's proposition, plainly is that in matters which do
not exclusively concern the city, the city cannot do precisely as it
pleases.
Perhaps, a somewhat bizarre illustration will clarify and dramatize
the issue. Suppose that the home rule city of X enacts an ordinance
that on the death of a resident of the city, intestate, all his property
shall pass to his nieces and nephews. Under one view, this would be
3. Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 257, 140 N.E. 595,
598 (1923).
4. Id.
5. Thus it has been held that for a state to surrender all its sovereignty to a
municipality within that municipality's borders would create a state within a
state, contrary to U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3. Straw v. Harris, 54 Ore. 424, 103
P. 777 (1909). Contra, 16 Wyo. L.J. 47, 51 (1961).
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the law until the legislature takes this power from the city. Under
the other view, the ordinance would have no validity. The courts
would strike down the ordinance as one dealing with a matter that
does not exclusively concern the city.
The question thus arises: by what state agency are the lines to
be drawn, and what criteria are to guide it in the drawing of these
lines? The constitution confers on the legislature power to deny or
to limit the powers and functions of a home rule unit.6 Arguably
then, the legislature could be the body that is to draw the lines, so
that if cities intrude into areas that the legislature feels are not purely
local, statutes could be enacted withdrawing this power from local
governments. In most home rule states, courts have assumed this
function. 7  Looking at a narrow area of property law will help to
bring this problem into focus, and looking at the constitution itself
will make clear that it does not solve the problem.
Many home rule states require home rule municipalities to frame
and adopt a charter or code before "home rule" powers may be exer-
cised. As a consequence, in many states large numbers of munici-
palities cannot make use of home rule powers because they have
failed to adopt charters. The Illinois Constitutional Convention
Committee on Local Government decided that the charter process is
unnecessarily complex and places undesirable impediments in the
path of the development of home rule. It was the opinion of the
Committee that "municipal structure and organization in Illinois
are sufficiently well developed to warrant the grant of extensive local
powers without first requiring the adoption of a charter for each
municipality."8
6. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
7. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 73, 267 N.W. 25, 31 (1936),
where Chief Justice Rosenberry of the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: "The
home-rule amendment does not lodge the power to determine what is a 'local af-
fair' or what is a 'matter of statewide concern' either with the municipality or with
the Legislature or attempt to define those terms. In the event of a controversy
between municipalities and the state therefore, the court is required to make the ul-
timate determination." There are sound reasons for this conclusion. If home rule
is to give freedom from legislative interference, it would hardly be advisable to
make the legislature the referee in the state's disputes with the city. It is equally
obvious that the city should not make the decision. 16 Wyo. L.J. 47, 64 (1961).
The problem is considered in greater detail subsequently. See text accompanying
notes 33 and 38 infra.
8. Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, Report of the Committee on Lo-
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT
In 1970, a new Illinois Constitution was ratified providing for
"home rule." The new constitution provides explicitly for home rule
without mention of the need for a charter, providing:
A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the electors of the county
and any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000 are home rule
units. Other municipalities may elect by referendum to become home rule units.
Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and per-
form any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited
to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and
welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt. l
The grant of local powers contained in this section is divided into
two parts: (1) a grant of general authority to exercise any power
and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs;
(2) a grant comprised of four basic powers-the power to regulate,
to license, to tax, and to incur indebtedness. Together, these two
parts of the section are designed to ensure that the specified counties
and municipalities receive directly under the constitution the broadest
possible range of powers to deal with problems facing them, and
with the demands that are made upon them by their residents and
by the greater society.1" In the words of Hon. John C. Parkhurst,
the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government, Sixth Illinois
Constitutional Convention, this grant of powers is "the most liberal
grant of home rule powers to any group of municipalities in the
country ... "I'
Other delegates to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention
were also of the opinion that the home rule grant of power was very
cal Government on Proposed New Constitution, Vol. VII at 1618 (1970) (herein-
after cited as Local Government Report). The alternatives to self-executing
home rule grants are discussed in Vanlandringham, supra note 1, 278. Experience
elsewhere has indicated the futility of the charter process. Dyson, supra note 2,
371-379. A number of alternatives are available to implement the home-rule
concept. 16 WYo. L.J. 47, 52 et seq. (1961). The self-executing constitutional
home rule adopted in Illinois seems the preferred alternative. 16 Wyo. L.J. 47, 58(1961); Ancel, 20th Century Powers for 20th Century Cities, 49 CHICAGO BAR
RECORD 226, 228 (1968).
9. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6a.
10. Baum, The Scope of Home Rule, 59 ILL. B.J. 814, 819 (1971). Professor
Baum was General Counsel to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Committee on Lo-
cal Government.
11. Transcript of remarks made by Hon. John C. Parkhurst, July 23, 1970,
to the Illinois Constitutional Convention. Proceedings of the Sixth Illinois Consti-
tutional Convention of 1969-70, Vol. IV at 3066 (hereinafter cited simply as Pro-
ceedings).
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broad. Hon. John G. Woods, member of the Local Government
Committee, made the following statement on July 23, 1970, to the
Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention sitting as a Committee of
the Whole:
If they have home rule . . . there is a lot of power in this article, and you either like
it or you don't. . . . But this is a broad grant of power that we are proposing to
you. Make no mistake about that!' 2
Delegate Phillip Carey, Vice Chairman of the Local Government
Committee, had this to say the same day:
In other words, you're given broad powers subject only to that pre-emption power of
the General Assembly, and this is an attempt . . . by . . . both the majority and
the minority-to get. away from court interpretations which have been the bane of all
home rule provisions in other states.1 3
On July 29, 1970, Delegate Weisberg made the following statement
to the Committee of the Whole:
[W]hat the Committee majo:ity has proposed here is a more extraordinary and
broad grant of automatic home rule power than exists under any other State Con-
stitution in the United States. 14
Except for the power to make local improvements by special as-
sessment and to levy additional taxes for the provision of special ser-
vices, any "home rule" power or function may be denied or limited
by the Illinois General Assembly. The constitution provides:
The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of the members
elected to each house may deny or limit the power to tax and any other power or
function of a home rule unit not exercised or performed by the State other than a
power or function specified in subsection (1) of this section.'5
The constitution also provides:
The General Assembly may not deny or limit the power of home tule units (I) to
make local improvements by special assessment and to exercise this power jointly
with other counties and municipalities, and other classes of units of local government
having that power on the effective date of this Constitution unless that power is
subsequently denied by law to any such other units of local government or (2)
to levy or impose additional taxes upon areas within their boundaries in th- manner
provided by law for the provision of special services to those areas and for the pay-
ment of debt incurred in order to provide those special services. 1 4;
12. Proceedings, Vol. IV, at 3051.
13. Proceedings, Vol. IV at 3053.
14. Proceedings, Vol. IV 3335.
15. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g). Where the legislature acts negatively, sim-
ply forbidding home rule units to exercise certain powers without assuming state
responsibility for the exercise of these functions, the three-fifths vote was pro-
vided to discourage "laundry list" legislation simply listing powers forbidden to
home rule units. Local Government Report, supra note 8, at 1642 (1970).
16. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(1).
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Thus the constitution contemplates that with respect to a particular
"home rule" power, the legislature may dictate that "home rule"
municipalities either should not exercise that power, or should exer-
cise it within limitations imposed by the legislature. There is general
agreement that the legislature should retain some authority to regu-
late the activities of home rule municipalities in order to prevent
abuse and to effect uniformity where necessary. Thus, there is a
good case for preserving state power over most, if not all, subjects
that fall within the powers granted to "home rule" cities. On the
other hand, there is a great danger of undue legislative restriction of
"home rule" powers if the legislature is, by a simple majority, able to
act on all matters affecting local governments-hence the require-
ment for a three-fifth majority.17
The Illinois Constitution also contains a broad pre-emption clause
which states:
The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise
by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit other than a taxing power
or a power or function specified in subsection (1) of this Section. 1 8
The "pre-emption clause" authorizes the General Assembly, by a
simple majority, to exclude "home rule" units from exercising any
power or performing any function if the state (the legislature) is ex-
ercising the power or performing the function, and if the statute
provides specifically that the state's exercise shall be exclusive.
An example of the application of this "pre-emption clause" is as
follows: Home Rule City adopts an ordinance requiring door-to-
door salesmen to obtain a city license prior to engaging in their trade
within the city. Under this clause, the General Assembly could, in-
stead, provide for a state-wide system of licensing, effected either
through a state agency or through local governments acting as agents
of the state. This state-wide system would, if declared exclusive by
the General Assembly, preclude local licensing by "home rule"
cities otherwise permitted under Section 6(a).1 '
Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power
or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law
17. Baum, The Scope of Home Rule, 59 ILL. B.J. 814, 823 (1971).
18. ILL. "CONST. art. VII, § 6(h). Compared to Art. VII, § 6(g), this is an
affirmative rather than a negative type of preemption. Here the legislature decides
to assume, as a state function, a function that might otherwise be deemed a local
function. A simple legislative majority suffices.
19. Baum, The Scope of Home Rule, 59 ILL. B.J. 814, 829-830 (1971).
364 [Vol. XXII: 359
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does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's
exercise to be exclusive. 20
Home rule units may, therefore, exercise power concurrently unless
their power is specifically taken away by legislation. For example,
the state, by statute, establishes a system for licensing beauticians.
Unless the statute provides that this licensing system is to be exclusive
with the state, "home rule" units may also engage in the licensing of
beauticians. Local licensing would be subject, however, to any
limitation specified in the statute, such, for example, as pertain to
qualifications, maximum fees, and the like.
21
It can be seen, then that the Illinois Constitution spells out re-
straints on the exercise by a "home rule" municipality of its "home
rule" powers. However, the constitution places no explicit limits on
the powers of a "home rule" municipality with respect to strictly
state affairs, such as enactments relating to the descent of intestate
property. As a result, the relationship between home rule powers
and statutes existing at the date of the adoption of this constitution
requires explication. It is clear that the adoption of the constitution
did not automatically repeal existing Illinois statutes. 2  It is equally
obvious that conflicts must necessarily arise between the Illinois
statutes that are now on our books and the ordinances enacted pur-
suant to the grant of home rule powers. When such conflicts arise,
it has been suggested that ordinances enacted within the scope of the
home rule power shall prevail over the statutes." The views to this
effect expressed on the convention floor are shared by Professor
Baum.24  It is the universal rule in states having home rule provi-
sions.25 It will be observed, however, that this rule will apply only
to ordinances enacted within the scope of the home rule power.
20. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).
21. Baum, The Scope of Home Rule, 59 ILL. B.J. 814, 830 (1971).
22. Transition Schedule, ILL. CONST. art. XlV, § 9. Professor Baum emphasizes
this point in Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part II): legislative
Control, Transition Problems, and Intergovernmental Conflict, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
599, 576-577, 581.
23. Proceedings, Vol. 92, pp. 37, 38, 40; Vanlandingham, supra note 1, 284-285.
24. Baum, The Constitutional Background of Home Rule, a presentation to the
Second Annual Local Government Law Institute, April 15, 1971.
25. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIION LAW § 3.16, at 137 (1968); Mc-
QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 21.28, at 243 (3rd ed. 1969); RIIYNE,
MUNICIPAL LAW § 113.2, at 55 (1957).
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Clearly, this again draws attention to the existence of some inherent
limitations on home rule.
''STATE AFFAIRS" V. "MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS"
What limitations may in fact be imposed on the localities may be
determined by examing the distinction, between so-called "state af-
fairs"2 6 and "local affairs. '2 7  There is no precise definition of either
term. The subject has been dealt with at length by the text writers
and some tests have been devised. Thus, if it appears that uniform
regulation throughout the state, either between urban and rural
areas or between all cities, is necessary or even desirable, the matter
26. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 67, 267 N.W. 25, 28 (1936),
where Chief Justice Rosenberry of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, after obvious re-
search on the question, was moved to conclude: "When is an enactment of the Leg-
islature of state-wide concern? We find no answer to this question in any decision
of any court in this country." The Chief Justice continued: "No other Consti-
tution uses the term 'matters of state-wide concern.' While these terms in some
contexts may have a definite content as used in the Constitution, they are prac-
tically indefinable." 222 Wis. at 73, 267 N.W. at 31; 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 4.85 at 164 (3rd ed. 1969); see Klemme, The Powers of Home
Rule Cities in Colorado, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 321, 329 (1964).
27. Sunset T. & T. Co. v. City of Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, 281, 118 P.796, 803
(1911), where the Supreme Court of California stated: "Are the matters referred to
'municipal affairs' within the meaning of those words as they are used in section 6
of article XI of the Constitution? There has been much discussion in our de-
cisions as to what matters are embraced in this term, and it has been said that
it is very difficult, if not impossible, to give a general definition clearly defin-
ing the term 'municipal affairs' and its scope." Similarly, in .Carlberg v. Met-
calfe, 120 Neb. 481, 484, 234 N.W. 87, 89-90 (1930), the Supreme Court of
Nebraska said: "A careful perusal of the decisions of the courts of other states,
wherein the question has arisen as to what are the functions of the municipality
and the functions of the state in relation to each other, clearly indicates that this
a difficult and intricate task. . . . The Constitution does not define which laws re-
late to matters of strictly municipal concern and which to state affairs. There is
no sure test which will enable us to distinguish between matters of strictly munici-
pal concern and those of state concern. The court must consider each case as
it arises and draw the line of demarcation." 120 Neb. 481, 487, 234 N.W. 87, 90
(1930). And in Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 81, 267 N.W. 25,
34 (1936), the Wisconsin Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rosen-
berry, said: "So far as we are able to discover, no one has undertaken to define
what is meant by local affairs and government." See MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS, § 4.85, at 164 (3rd ed. 1969). The court decisions are conflicting
in their views regarding local affairs as distinguished from state affairs. For
example, Oklahoma has held that the assessment and collection of the property tax
is a state matter and Nebraska has held the contrary. 16 Wyo. L.J. 47, 62, 63(1961). The problem is aggravated by the fact that the concept of "municipal
affairs" appears to fluctuate with the times. Vanlandingham, supra note 1, 291;
36 S. CAL. L. REV. 430, 431.
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is a "state affair."'28  Again, historical considerations play some
part in the determination that a subject matter is either local or
state. 9 This test can be helpful in areas that have a reliable history.
Thus, to revert to an example given earlier, statutes of descent are
historically a state affair. But matters that have only a brief history
-for example, environmental control-are bound to present prob-
lems.
Another test relates to the impact of legislation on people outside
the city. If the effect of municipal control is not great upon non-
residents, the matter may well be considered a local affair.3 0 Where
uniformity and cooperation among governmental units are necessary,
and where action of state and county officials within the limits of the
city is imperative to effectuate adequate protection outside the city,
the matter will in all likelihood be considered a state affair.3 An-
other author argues that all of those public affairs which alone con-
cern the inhabitants of the locality as an organized community apart
from the people of the state at large, are local affairs.3 2 In states
where the line is drawn by the courts, by a slow process of inclusion
and exclusion, the courts have determined that certain subjects are
either within or without the category of local affairs. 3  The result,
of course, has been that until a given question has been decided by
the local supreme court, no one knows for sure whether a given sub-
ject falls within the ambit of local affairs, since "judges are required
to make vital allocations of governmental power on the basis of a
28. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL COR'ORATION LAW § 3.36 at 162 (1968). -
29. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 75, 267 N.W. 25, 32 (1936),
where the Court said: "So far as we have been able to discover in all jurisdic-
tions where the question has arisen because of a conflict between a charter ordinance
adopted under a home-rule provision of a Constitution and an act of the Legisla-
ture, the matter of police and fire protection has been held to be a 'matter of
state-wide concern' for the following reasons . . . (6) because for a long time
these duties have been delegated to and performed by the various municipal sub-
divisions of the state, these functions are ordinarily thought of as being in part
the primary duties of cities and municipalities." See ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATION LAW § 3.36, at 162 (1968).
30. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §3.36, at 162 (1968).
31. Id.
32. 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 4.85 (3rd ed. 1966).
33. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 64 (1957); Dyson, supra note 2, at 368; Comment,
The State v. The City: A Study in Pre-Emption, 36 So. CAL. L. REV. 430, 431
(1963).
19721
368 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII:359
phrase that has acquired no empirical meaning." 4  There is a com-
mon understanding that such general subjects as crime, domestic
relations, wills and administration, mortgages, trusts, contracts, real
and personal property, insurance, banking, and corporations are not
local affairs."' Also, where the matter is one intimately concerning
the state, such as the requirement of a city building permit for state
buildings, the application of city zoning ordinances to state building
authorities, the sales to state institutions, or the control of state high-
ways, state control prevails over home rule.'"
Complicating the picture is the fact that many governmental func-
tions are "mixed," with local officials performing state functions."'
Thus the state court system may be created by state law, but judges,
prosecutors, sheriffs, etc., may be chosen locally. The state court
system, nevertheless, is a state institution. Also, operating within
some urban areas are special-purpose authorities such as housing
and transportation authorities. Plainly, the power of home rule cities
to legislate with respect to these special-purpose authorities is either
limited or non-existent.
Pre-Eminence of State Legislation in the Area of State Affairs.
In states having home rule provisions there is agreement that state
legislation should prevail in all matters that are deemed "state af-
34. Dyson, supra note 2, 369, 379.
35. Dell v. City of Lincoln, 170 Neb. 176, 102 N.W.2d 62, 73 (1960),
where the Nebraska Supreme Court said: "As we view it, statutes which are
enacted for the transfer or protection of the property rights of every owner of
real property in the state . . . and the compensation which such owners are en-
titled to receive for the public use or disposal thereof as well, is of state-wide con-
cern." Similarly, in Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 489, 167 N.E. 705, 713
(1929), the late Mr. Justice Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals, made the following observations in a concurring opinion: 'There
are some affairs intimately connected with the exercise by the city of its cor-
porate functions, which are city affairs only . . . There are other affairs ex-
clusively those of the state, such as the law of domestic relations, of wills, of in-
heritance, of contracts, of crimes not essentially local ....... To like effect are
Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts,
48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 659 (1964); Baum, supra note 24, III A; Comment, Muni-
cipal Home Rule Power: Impact on Private Legal Relationships, 56 IOWA L. REV.
631, 632 (1971).
36. Kneier, City-State Conflict in the Use of Municipal Police Power, 50 Ky.
L.J. 200, 201, 203, 204, 209 (1961-62).
37. Hanson, Toward a New Urban Democracy: Metropolitan Consolidation and
Decentralization, 58 GEo. L.J. 863, 872 (1970).
38. ANTIrAu, MMCuAI. CORPORATON LAW § 3.16, at 137 (1968).
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fairs.""8 Through exercise of the pre-emptive power the legislature can
deny to a municipal corporation a power that relates clearly to a local
affair. Or the power can be used to clear up any ambiguity. But even
in the absence of any legislative action, an ordinance by a home rule
municipality will, according to some authorities, be declared invalid
by the courts if it invades the province of pure state affairs. Or, to
put the proposition in negative form, home rule municipalities, it is
felt by many courts, have no home rule power to legislate on matters
that do not pertain to their affairs.
It has been said that two approaches to the question of home rule
municipal power in state affairs are possible and have been taken by
the courts. First, it can be ruled that even though the problem is
one of state concern and shared by cities throughout the state, a home
rule municipality has power to act thereon until the state acts. Or,
alternatively, municipal power in matters of state concern can be
denied by the courts in the absence of a specific constitutional or
legislative grant.39
After citing authority for the second proposition, Antieau argues
for the first proposition, saying:
Nevertheless, because state legislatures seldom get around to providing guides on all
matters of "state" concern, and since these matters often greatly affect conditions
in home rule cities and need control, it is suggested that the first approach is far
preferable. 40
Antieau then suggests a third view, 4 namely, that the municipality
may act in matters of state concern within its territorial limits unless
the legislature has appropriated the field.42
The language of the Illinois Constitution grants home rule power
to a municipality "to perform any function pertaining to its govern-
ment and affairs."'" This language is devoid of any grants of powers
over state affairs within the territorial limits of the municipality.
But Professor Baum argues that this is not conclusive.44 Clearly,
39. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.06, at 106 (1968).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
43. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
44. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and Limi-
tations, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 137, 156. Professor Baum states that Section 6(i)
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this issue is left in doubt until our Supreme Court speaks. Until
then any home rule ordinance operating in any area that might be
deemed to be a state affair is suspect. In short, prudence dictates at
least a temporary acceptance of the notion that a home rule unit has
no powers in the area of state affairs.
Implied Pre-Emption.
After the adoption of home rule constitutions, legislatures con-
tinue to legislate, as they have in the past, on matters of state
concern. They seldom spell out their intention to exclude from
such legislation home rule units legislating in the same field. 5
And home rule cities, enjoying their new freedom, have en-
acted ordinances that seem to cover ground normally covered by
state legislation. To cope with this problem, some courts have
evolved the doctrine of implied pre-emption. Under this doctrine,
if the city attempts to legislate in an area preempted by the state,
its action is void."" Determining whether the ordinance can stand
is, in these jurisdictions, a matter for the courts. 7 A variety of
.minimizes" judicial preemption. Baum, supra note 22, at 572. But he recognizes
that "Islome difficult, perhaps insoluble problems remain." Ibid. Where an
unavoidable conflict exists between a statute and an ordinance of a home jule
unit, he feels that the constitution gives no express guidance as to how this problem
is to be resolved. Id. at 573. Again, he says that the Illinois approach places
"almost" exclusive reliance on the legislature rather than the courts to keep home
ule units in line. He recognizes that the courts should occasionally step in. Id.
at 579.
45. 72 HARV. L. REV. at 747, supra note 2.
46. Feiler, Conflict between State and Local Enactments--The Doctrine of Im-
plied Preemption, 2 URBAN LAW. REV. 398 (1970); Comment, The State v. The
City: A Study in Pre-emption (1970); 36 So. CAL. L. REV. 430, 434, 442 (1963).
47. 72 HARV. L. REV. 737, 747 (1959). It is not universally conceded that this
is a problem for the courts. There is much dissatisfaction with the solution offered
by the courts. See, e.g., 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 430, 442 (1963). It was the view
of Dean Fordham that court decisions unduly fettered home rule cities and that
the constitution should rule out judicial interference by granting plenary legislative
power to home rule cities, equal with that of the legislature, not limited to lo-
cal affairs, subject only to such specific interdiction as the legislature might see fit
to impose. Dyson, Ridding Home Rule of the Local Affairs Problem, 12 KAN. L.
Rev. 376 (1963-64); Walker, Toward a New Theory of Municipal Home Rule, 50
Nw. U.L. REV. 571, 581 (1955); Note, Municipal Home Rule in Iowa: House
File 380, 49 IowA L. REV. 826, 829 (1964); Comment, Municipal Home Rule
Powers Impact on Private Legal Relationships, 56 IOWA L. REV. 631, 641 (1971).
The Fordham proposal was considered by the Illinois Convention. In the end the
decision went against adoption of the Fordham proposal. Local Government Report,
supra note 8, at 46-47. Instead, the convention opted for the more conservative view
that home rule cities should be given plenary powers, such as those granted in
NEW YORK CONST. art. IX, § 2(c), to legislate regarding local affairs.
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tests have been devised by the courts to determine the extent of con-
flict. 4 8
How this problem will be resolved in Illinois remains to be seen.
As to existing state legislation and future home rule ordinances, it
seems that court decisions may be essential to resolve any conflict.
As to future state legislation, predictions are difficult. It is unlikely
that the legislature will always tag on its enactments a statement that
the state's exercise of power is or is not intended to exclude like
enactments by home rule cities. At times this will be done.4 9  At
other times the legislature may not speak to this point. Suppose, for
example, that the legislature adopts the Uniform Probate Act or the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code. It is unlikely that it would feel
obliged to say anything about home rule cities. The legislation
speaks for itself. The entire state is affected, including home rule
cities, and city action in this area is impliedly forbidden.
Governmental and Municipal Functions Distinguished
It must be remembered that a home rule municipality functions
in two separate and distinct capacities. As a municipal corporation,
it acts as an arm of the state and exercises the governmental func-
tions and powers of such,"0 thereby contributing to the convenient
administration of the government. Its purely municipal or proprie-
tary functions consist of those granted for the specific benefit and
advantage of the urban community embraced within the corporate
boundaries.' Within this context, land held for governmental pur-
48. Feiler, supra note 46, passim. See text accompanying footnotes 38, et seq.
49. Montgomery, State Pre-emption and Local Legislation, 4 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 188 (1963-64). See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. Ill 12. §§ 713, 736 (1971),
providing for the licensing and regulation of mobile home parks, with a provision
that it does not apply within the jurisdiction of any home rule unit. See also,
Opinion of Atty. Gen., Ill., No. S-496--July 24, 1972, in which the Attorney
General advised Dr. Yoder, Director of the Department of Public Health, that
the Mobile Home Park Act (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, §§ 711 et seq. (1971)) ald
the Recreational Area Licensing Act (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/, §§ 761 et seq.
(1971) do not apply to a municipality located within a home rule county, even
though the municipality itself is not a home rule unit.
50. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25, (1936);
62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §§ 2, 3 (1949).
51. 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations §§ 2, 5 (1949). See also City of Tucson
v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. 1, 164 P.2d 598, criticized in ANTIEAU,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.17, at 143 (1968).
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poses is treated differently from land held for purely local or muni-
cipal purposes.
Absent home rule authority, statutory authority is needed to sell
land being used for governmental purposes.5 2  It is certainly argua-
ble that a municipality dealing with, let us say, a firehouse in ac-
tive use is not engaged in a local affair. The same could be said of a
home rule county attempting to sell the county court house. Per-
haps, this is what Antieau had in mind when he said:
Unless the property is used essentially for educational, health, police or fire pur-
poses, there is a tendency to apply local rules rather than state legislation to the ac-
quisition, management and disposal of municipal properties. 53
Therefore, it would seem to follow that in dealing with sales or
leases of surplus land or with street vacations, the municipality is
dealing with land that has lost its governmental character, because it
is no longer serving a governmental function. Municipalities, acting
sensibly and in awareness of what has been stated here, have con-
fined their dispositions to land not needed and not being used for a
governmental purpose. Thus, the litigation tends to focus on pro-
cedural matters, such as the necessity of obtaining bids. However,
where the land is no longer classified as governmental land, home
rule units should be able to devise their own procedure.
SALES OF CITY LAND
At this juncture an analysis of specific urban land problems aris-
ing under the Illinois Municipal Home Rule system will provide fur-
ther insight into the practical workings of this new grant of power.
Under the Illinois statutes, which have continued vitality under the
constitution, a bidding procedure is prescribed for the sale of city
52. McRobie v. Westernport, 260 Md. 464, 467, 272 A.2d 655 (1971), where
the Supreme Court of Maryland, in holding that a parking lot was held in a gov-
ernmental capacity, stated: "Property held or maintained in proprietary capacity
may be disposed of unless specifically restrained by charter or statute, but property
held in a governmental capacity cannot be disposed of without express authority."
Rhyne says: "It is the general rule that in the absence of charter or statutory
authority, municipal property dedicated and being used for a governmental purpose,
or held in trust may not be sold by a municipality." RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § 16-
11, at 379 (1957); Also, the general rule seems to be that municipalities may sell,
without statutory authority, land which is not actually being used for a public pur-
pose, although it was bought for a public use. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
LAW § 20.19, at 74-75 (1968).
53. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.19, at 147 (1968).
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land no longer needed for public purposes.14 The question that now
arises is whether the sale of this city land is a local affair, which en-
ables a city to dispense with the bidding procedure and sell the land
at a private sale. How this land is disposed of obviously concerns
only the residents of the city. Without the slightest doubt, we can
conclude that the statutory bidding procedure is inapplicable to the
sale of such property. 5 This does no violence to the notion that
home rule does not extend to real property matters. What is meant
is that municipal home rule does not extend to specifying the legal
requirement for deeds, easements, or mortgages. These are matters
that should be uniform throughout the state, but how a municipality
disposes of its own land is a matter that concerns only that muni-
cipality.56
LEASES OF CITY LAND
Just as the courts have determined that the sale of municipal real
estate is a municpal or local matter,5 ' they also have held that the
leasing of city-owned real estate is purely a local matter. Therefore,
home rule cities are not constrained by statutory inhibitions in rela-
tion thereto.
In Ohio, which has had home rule since 1912, the City of Colum-
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-76-2 (1971).
55. Tucson v. Arizona Alpha of Sigma Alpha Epsilon, 67 Ariz. 330, 195 P.2d
562 (1948); State v. Redick, 168 Ohio St. 543, 157 N.E.2d 106 (1959). Whete a
statute existing at the date of the Constitution sets forth procedural requiem,',nts-
such as the percentage vote required to vacate a street or hearing requirements before
changing zoning-it might be prudent for the home iule municipality to adopt its
own procedural ordinance to indicate its decision to abolish the satutoiy require-
ments. This is consistent with the idea that under the General Transition section the
old statutes remain applicable, even as to local affairs, until the home lule unit
displaces them. As to statutes enacted after the date of the Constitution, if the
statute imposes a procedural requirement it must, to be effective as to local affairs,
be enacted by a three-fifths vote of the legislature. Baum, supra note 22, at 570.
Professor Baum makes a convincing argument that statutes enacted prior to the
Constitution, even though by a three-fifths majority, can be displaced by inconsistent
home rule ordinances relating to local affais. Supra note 22, at 578.
56. Tucson v. Arizona Alpha of Sigma Alpha Epsilon, 67 Ariz. 330, 195 P.2d
562 (1948); Strode v. Sullivan, 72 Ariz. 360, 236 P.2d 48 (1951); City of
Marysville v. Boyd, 181 Cal. App. 2d 755, 5 Cal. Rptr. 598; State ex rel. Leach v.
Redick, 168 Ohio St. 543, 157 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Babin v. City of Ashland, 160
Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953); Hugger v. City of Ironton, 83 Ohio App.
21, 30-31, 82 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1947); ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 3.19, at 147 (1968). 72 HRv. L. REV. 737, 741, supra note 2 (1959).
57. Supra notes 47 and 48 and accompanying text.
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bus, a home rule city, passed an ordinance directing a city official to
execute a lease of city-owned land to the Linden Veterans' Center
Association. The official refused to do so on the ground that the
ordinance was invalid for the reason, inter alia, that it was passed in
disregard of a statute which provided that an ordinance authorizing
the sale or lease of municipal property must be approved by two-
thirds of the members of the legislative authority of the municipal
corporation, and that the property must be sold or leased to the
highest bidder only. The Supreme Court of Ohio, holding that it
was not necessary that those statutory requirements be met, stated:
Municipalities, which, under their charters have full power to exercise local self-
government, may convey property without resort to the exactions required by state
statutes. . . . It seems to us that the lease which deals with a lot owned by the
city of Columbus, presents only a local problem, and that, therefore, the provisions
of [the statute] have no application.5 8
Four years later, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the home
rule city of Ketchikan was not constrained to follow the provisions
of a statute which permitted municipalities to lease their municipal
property only after they had found that it was no longer required
for municipal purposes. 59 After receiving voter approval, the city
had executed an agreement to lease a hospital to a charitable, non-
profit corporation for a period of ten years at a rental of one dollar
a year. In an action to cancel the lease, Lien assailed the lease as
being invalid on the ground, inter alia, that the city council had vio-
lated the statute, because they failed to find that the hospital prop-
erty was not required for municipal purposes. The court responded
in this language:
The statute relied upon by plaintiff has no application to this case. We hold that
[the statute] which authorizes municipalities to lease [their] property, is not relevant
where the powers of a home rule city are being considered. 60
Very recently, in Macauley v. Hildebrand,6 1 the Supreme Court of
Alaska emphasized, in distinguishing the Lien case, that the leasing
of municipal property is clearly and purely a matter of local concern:
In Lien v. City of Ketchikan [citation omitted] we recognized that under the Alaska
Constitution home rule municipalities have broad governmental powers and refused
58. State ex rel. Leach v. Redick, 168 Ohio St. 543, 546-47, 157 N.E.2d 106,
109 (1959).
59. Lien v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721, 723 (Alaska, 1963).
60. Id.
61. Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 121-122 (Alaska, 1971).
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to void a lease of municipal property even though the city had not complied with a
general state statute regarding such leases. Lien, however, dealt with a matter of
purely local concern, the leasing of municipal property (emphasis added).
Thus, the determination of whether a home rule municipality can enforce an ordi-
nance which conflicts with a state statute depends on whether the matter regulated
is of state-wide or local concern. . . . [I]n Lien, on the other hand, we were deal-
ing with a city's power to lease municipal property, clearly a matter of local concern
(emphasis added).62
Specifically, the leasing of tidelands or submerged lands by a home
rule municipality presents a matter of slightly different dimensions.
The California case of Silver v. City of Los Angeles" is a case in
point. It involved an action by a taxpayer to set aside an oil and
gas lease of over 6400 acres of submerged lands situated in the Los
Angeles Outer Harbor. Parties to the lease were the home rule
City of Los Angeles and a private oil development company. In
accordance with well-established doctrine applicable both to tide-
lands and submerged lands, the lands were held in trust for the pub-
lic for purposes of navigation and the like. The issue before the
California Supreme Court was whether, in the absence of fraud, col-
lusion, ulta vires, or failure by a municipality to perform a duty spe-
cifically enjoined, a taxpayer could bring, in his representative ca-
pacity, an action to set aside a contract entered into between a
municipality and a private corporation relative to lands held by the
municipality in trust.
In holding that the taxpayer could not maintain his action, the
court had the following to say about the leasing of the lands by the
city:
Although the proper use of the tidelands . . . is a statewide affair [citations
omitted], this does not mean that the administration of the trust is in all matters a
statewide affair. [citations omitted]. ...
Defendant municipality is a charter city, and until the Legislature acts to provide
otherwise, the manner in which it effectuates the purposes of the tidelands trust, in-
cluding the manner in which it conducts negotiations for the leasing of the lands, is
a municipal affair. [citations omitted]. ...
At the time the lease was executed (December 28, 1956), ... there was no relevant
charter or statutory provision directing the manner in which the lands were to be
leased.6
4
62. Id. at 121-22.
63. Silver v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 39, 366 P.2d 651, 17 Cal. Rptr.
379 (1962).
64. Id.
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Two years after the lease was executed, the California legislature
enacted specific legislation governing the procedures by which oil
and gas leases were to be granted by municipalities. The legislation
applied to non-charter cities with respect to all oil and gas leases,
and to home rule (charter) cities only with respect to tidelands and
submerged lands granted in trust to them by the state.65  Thus it
seems that where tidelands or submerged lands are involved, a
municipality holds them more in its governmental capacity, i.e., as
an arm of the state, than in its municipal capacity. In other words,
it seems that tidelands and submerged lands are to be treated more
as land held for governmental purposes than land held for purely
municipal purposes. It is surely arguable that a home rule munici-
pality contemplating the leasing of ocean beach property will not be
engaged in a local affair to the extent that it can ignore statutory
law governing the sale or the leasing of tidelands.
VACATIONS OF CITY STREETS
Except where a street forms a link in a state highway, the authori-
ties seem to agree that the vacation of a public street is an area in
which a home rule municipality should have the power to legislate
without regard to conflicting statutes. Thus, in Constantine v. City
of Sunnyvale,6" the California Appellate Court held that although
the question of the elimination of grade crossings is a matter of state
concern, the vacation of city streets falls within the scope of munici-
pal affairs; it may be accomplished without the consent of the State
Railroad Commission, unless it interferes with the operation of a
railroad.
Earlier, in Sunset Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Pasa-
dena,17 the Supreme Court of California had the followng to say:
"It is unquestioned that the matter of opening, widening and vacat-
ing the streets of a municipality is purely a municipal affair."
And in the initial issue of the California Law Review, Professor Wil-
65. WEST CAL. PUB. RES. CODE, §§ 7058.5, 7059, 7060, 7061 (1959). Per-
haps the inference is warranted that the legislature thought that both the city and
the court were wrong in thinking of the disposition of a tideland as anything but
a state affair.
66. Constantine v. City of Sunnyvale, 91 Cal. App. 2d 278, 204 P.2d 922
(1949).
67. Sunset T. & T. Co. v. City of Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, 282, 118 P. 796, 803
(1911).
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liam Carey Jones stated: "The opening, widening and vacating of
streets of a municipality is a purely municipal matter, and it is as-
sumed in all the decisions that the control of city streets is a local or
municipal affair. ,,8
In his treatise on roads and streets,69 Elliot stated that the matter
of city streets was peculiarly one of municipal control and local in-
terest. Elliot reasoned that this must be so because, among other
things, a municipality becomes liable for failure to keep its streets
safe on the theory that it has exclusive control over them and the
power to raise money to maintain them in safe condition for travel.
According to Elliot:
There is an essential difference between cases where the matter is a general govern-
mental one, and cases where the matter is so peculiarly one of municipal control
and local interest as streets, and it seems to us that some of the courts have been
misled by supposing an analogy to exist between the two classes when, upon analy-
sis, it will be found there is none ...
The object of incorporating a town or city is to invest the inhabitants of the locality
with the government of all the matters that are of special municipal concern, and
certainly the streets are as much of special and local concern as anything connected
with a town or city can well be. It ought, therefore, to be presumed that they pass
under the exclusive control of the municipality as soon as it comes into existence
under the law. 7
0
The Supreme Court of Nebraska held, in Lee v. City of McCook,7
that when the city enlarged its corporate limits and annexed territory
over which there existed a highway previously laid out by the county
commissioners, the highway became impressed with the character of
a street and the commissioners relinquished control and jurisdiction
to the city council, who then became the only body empowered to
vacate the roadway. In In re Hull,72 the Supreme Court of Minnesota
noted that those home rule charters which did not contain some pro-
vision for the vacation of streets by the municipal authorities were few
indeed. The court further noted that in Balch v. St. Anthony Park
West,73 it had held that since the charter of St. Paul, a home rule city,
provided a method for the vacation of streets by the city authorities, a
68. Jones, "Municipal Affairs" in the California Constitution, 1 CAL. L. REv.
132, 140 (1913).
69. 1 ELLIOT, ROADS AND STREETS § 504, at 505 (3rd ed. 1911).
70. Id.
71. Lee v. City of McCook, 82 Neb. 26, 116 N.W. 955 (1908).
72. In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 204 N.W. 534 (1925).
73. Balch v. St. Anthony Park West, 129 Minn. 305, 152 N.W. 643 (1915).
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district court, therefore, lacked the power to vacate a street under a
statute which authorized a district court to vacate streets. The ex-
ception to this rule occurs when the municipality has its own charter
providing for the vacating of streets by the local authorities."4
Where a street forms a link in a state highway or turnpike, how-
ever, it seems that the vacating of such street would not be held to
be a purely municipal affair, for the courts have generally sub-
scribed to the view that home rule powers granted to cities over their
streets may not be used to interfere with the state's control over its
highways.7'; A few representative cases will illustrate this view.
In City of Lakewood v. Thormyer, 6 the City of Lakewood sought
to enjoin the state highway director from taking action leading
toward the relocation and abandonment of parts of state highways
located in the cities of Lakewood and Rocky River. The court re-
jected the contention of Lakewood that a statute providing for such
action after court approval contravened the city's home rule powers
granted by the Ohio Constitution. The court held that such powers
related only to "local self-government" and not to the construction
of a turnpike across the state.77 The court's language that "the con-
struction of a turnpike across the state hardly can be considered a
matter of local self-government" was taken from the opinion of the
Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Allen,7" where it was held that the
state turnpike commission need not, in order to avoid violating a
city's right of home rule, obtain the consent of the city before build-
ing a turnpike through it, since such construction was a state con-
cern, not a matter of local self-government.7 9
74. In closely analogous subject matter, the cases in Missouri contain hold-
ings or dicta that municipal ordinances of home rule cities will prevail over
conflicting statutes with respect to the opening and grading of streets. The reason
for these judicial utterances is that the opening and improving of streets within a
city are matters which are "clearly municipal affairs." Westbrook, Municipal
Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Experience, 33 Mo. L. REV. 45, 64
(1968). ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.24, at 153 (1968).
75. Kneier, City-State Conflict in the Use of Municipal Police Power, 50 KY. L.J.
200, 208-11 (1961).
76. City of Lakewood v. Thormyer, 79 Abs. 41, 154 N.E.2d 662 (Ohio Com-
mon Pleas 1957).
77. Id. at 670.
78. State v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345 (1952).
79. See also, Southern Cal. Roads Co. v. McGuire, 2 Cal. 2d 115, 39 P.2d 412
(1934).
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The Indiana case of Larson v. Town of Wynnedale80 involved an
action to enjoin a town from vacating a street within its boundaries,
where the street was a continuation of a public highway denominated
a county road outside the town. The Indiana Appellate Court held
that although a town had exclusive power to vacate existing high-
ways located wholly within its limits, there was an exception to this
rule, arising in instances where the highway was either a federal or
state highway.
In the very recent case of Jones v. City of Ypsilanti,81 the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals held that the city was responsible for main-
taining the safe condition of sidewalks within the city. This result
was obtained notwithstanding the fact that the defective sidewalk on
which plaintiff tripped adjoined a state trunkline highway. The
court reasoned that municipalities should retain reasonable control
over state trunkline highways located within their boundaries, to the
extent that such control pertains to local concerns and does not con-
flict with the paramount jurisdiction of the state highway commis-
sion.
Much earlier, in Rogers v. City of Jackson,12 the Michigan Su-
preme Court had upheld the validity of the city's vacating a city
street which formed part of a state road without giving notice to or
soliciting approval from the state highway commissioner. The
court's decision was based upon a statute that expressly gave to
municipalities the power to vacate all "state roads which . . .may
be within the corporate limits of any city or village within the state." 3
The statute was subsequently repealed so that Michigan munici-
palities are now expressly prohibited from vacating any part of a
street or road which has been duly designated as a state highway.84
The statute, construed by the court in Rogers and later repealed by
the legislature, ran counter to the current of modern judicial think-
ing. The courts would today probably hold that the vacating of any
part of a state highway could be accomplished only by, or at least
with the concurrence of, the state.
80. Larson v. Town of Wynnedale, 133 Ind. App. 337, 180 N.E.2d 386
(1962).
81. Jones v. City of Ypsilanti, 26 Mich. App. 574, 182 N.W.2d 795 (1971).
82. Rogers v. City of Jackson, 251 Mich. 256, 231 N.W. 621 (1930).
83. Id. at 258, 231 N.W. at 622 (1930).
84. MICH. STAT. ANN. vol. 7, § 9.541 (1929).
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ZONING
In two earlier cases, the view was expressed that the zon;ng
power was not essential to local government,", and that it was
not of purely municipal concern.8 6 Now, however, zoning has come
to be recognized by the courts of several jurisdictions as peculiarly
within the province of local government so that, in the event of con-
flict between state laws and home rule ordinances, the latter will
generally prevail.17  Thus, in what Professor Antieau has called a
well-reasoned decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
zoning ordinances could be adopted under Philadelphia's own pro-
cedures, even though the adoption did not satisfy the state statute.
The court explained:
Surely, there are few matters which are of less state-wide concern and which are
more local in scope than zoning inside the City of Philadelphia . . . there can be
no reasonable dispute that where, as in the instant case, the Council acts on a matter
which is of purely local concern in a manner inconsistent with a State law, the
ordinance must prevail. 8 8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held that the legislative
prohibition against a home rule city's exercise of powers contrary to
other acts of the General Assembly applies only to substantive mat-
ters of state-wide concern, but not to zoning, which is peculiarly a
local matter.8
In Colorado, one of the oldest constitutional home rule states,"0
a statute providing for changing zoning regulations, restrictions,
or boundaries, when objected to by twenty per cent of the property
owners in the area affected by the change, requires a three-fourths
vote of the council before such an amendment shall become effec-
85. Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 214-17, 177 N.W. 722, 725 (1920).
86. Wippler v. Hohn, 341 Mo. 780, 785-86, 110 S.W.2d 409, 411 (1937).
87. One eminent scholar of home rule law has stated that early attempts to base
zoning upon home rule power were generally rebuffed by the courts, but that recent
decisions appear to support the conclusion that the authority to zone may now be
based on the grant of home rule. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Un-
der Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV,. 643, 718, n.285 (1964).
But see Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1055, 1097-1098
(June 1972), where Professor Sato advances his opinion that there is no room for lo-
cal autonomy even in the field of land use regulations where there is a conflict
between state and local enactments.
88. ANTI-EAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.35, at 164-65 (1968).
89. School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Zoning Bd. of Adjusment, 417 Pa. 277,
282-84, 207 A.2d 864, 868 (1965).
90. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1,. adopted for Denver Nov. 4,. 1902; art. XX, §
6, adopted for other home rule cities and towns Nov. 5, 1912.
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tive.9 ' In a very recent decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held
that the statute was superseded by a comprehensive home rule city
zoning ordinance which specifically eliminated the three-fourths ma-
jority requirement and provided, instead, that any change would only
require the affirmative vote of a simple majority of the entire city
council. Said the court: "We hold that zoning under [the] Colo-
rado Constitution, art. XX, §6, is local and municipal matter. 2
A California appellate court recently observed in dictum that zon-
ing is a municipal affair over which a home rule city has supreme
control, and which lies beyond the scope of legislative action.:,
Earlier, the California Supreme Court had held that the issuance of
permits for the erection of buildings within its territorial limits is a
municipal affair over which San Francisco, as a home rule city, has
supreme control."
In Ohio, another constitutional home rule state, home rule muni-
cipalities directly exercise the sovereignty of the state in dealing with
problems of zoning-as well as kindred matters of urban renewal,
open space programs, building codes, and other land use controls-
so that each home rule municipality may determine its own objectives
and concepts of desirable urban development without the difficulties
of obtaining statutory authority."' Observing that the Ohio Consti-
tution grants a municipality the option of determining its own plan
of local self-government by framing and adopting a home rule charter,
the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
If a municipality adopts a [home rule-I charter it thereby and thereunder has the
power to enact and enforce ordinances relating to local affairs, but, if it does not,
its organization and operation are regulated by the statutory provisions covering the
subject.96
The court then held that because the Village of Oakwood had not
91. COLO. REV. STAT. § 139-60-5 (1963).
92. Roosevelt v. City of Englewood, 492 P.2d 65, 70 (Colo., 1971). See also
Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 255 P. 443 (1927). See Klemme,
The Powers of Home Rule Cities in Colorado, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 321, 360
(1964).
93. Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal. App. 2d 313, 323-24, 21 Cal. Rptr. 452,
458 (1962).
94. Lindell Co. v. Bd. of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 313, 144 P.2d 4,
8-9 (1944).
95. Crawford, Home Rule and Land Use Control, 13 W. RES. L. REV. 702, 705
(1962).
96. Morris v. Roseman, 162 Ohio St. 447, 450, 123 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1954).
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adopted a home rule charter incorporating provisions related to zon-
ing, it was, therefore, still subject to statutory enactments with re-
spect to the procedure to be followed in the adoption of zoning ordi-
nances. Chief Justice Weygandt dissented on the authority of an
earlier case97 wherein the Ohio Supreme Court had held that the
home rule provisions of the Ohio Constitution were self-executing,
and that the power of local self-government was inherent in all muni-
cipalities regardless of enabling legislation and the existence of muni-
cipal charters. 98
In Minnesota, the supreme court recently held, in A.C.E. Equip-
ment Co. v. Erickson,"9 that, in purely local matters such as zoning,
the provisions of Minneapolis' Home Rule Charter should prevail
over general statutes regulating state-wide problems. The court
quoted as follows from State v. City of Crookston:.00
As stated in American Elec. Co. v. City of Waseca [citations omitted]: the pro-
visions of home rule charters upon all subjects proper for municipal regulation pre-
vail over the general statutes relating to the same subject-matter, except in those
cases where the charter contravenes the public policy of the state, as declared by the
general laws, and in those instances where the legislature expressly declares that a
general law shall prevail, or a purpose that it shall so prevail appears by fair implica-
tion, taking into consideration the subject and the general nature of the charter
and general statutory provisions.1 0 1
In State ex rel. Ekern v. Milwaukee,102 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had under consideration the validity of an ordinance adopted
by the home rule city of Milwaukee by which the city elected that a
statute limiting the height of buildings in cities of the first class
should not apply to the city of Milwaukee. The ordinance fixed a
maximum height higher than was prescribed in the statute. After
some discussion of several of the considerations affecting the con-
struction of the home rule amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution,
the court said:
As applied to the situation here presented, we hold that, though the height of build-
ings in cities is of state-wide concern . . . nevertheless . . . the height of buildings
in a particular community is a problem and affair which much more intimately and
97. Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
98. Supra note 96, at 452, 123 N.E.2d at 422.
99. A. C. E. Equipment Co. v. Erickson, 277 Minn. 457, 152 N.W.2d 739
(1967).
100. State v. City of Crookston, 252 Minn. 526, 91 N.W.2d 81 (1958).
101. Id. at 529, 91 N.W.2d 83-84.
102. State ex rel. Ekern v. Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 633, 209 N.W. 860 (1926).
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directly concerns the inhabitants of that community than the casual visitor or the
other parts of the state, and it is therefore a 'local affair' of such community within
the Amendment.' o3
In New York, a breakdown of cases recently undertaken by Prof es-
sor Macchiarola led him to conclude that home rule has been upheld
by New York courts in an increasing number of areas, and that the
area of local government's greatest strength is in the powers over
zoning.10 4
In Illinois one cannot predict, on the basis of adjudicated cases,
whether our courts will follow what appears to be a trend, in the
direction of regarding zoning as a matter peculiarly within the prov-
ince of a home rule unit. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that,
in at least two decisions, our supreme court has stated:
Zoning lies primarily within the province of the municipality, and t is ne'ther the
province nor the duty of courts to interfere with the discretion with which the mu-
nicipal authorities are vested unless the action of the municipal authorities is shown
to be unrelated to the public health, safety, and morals (emphasis added). 10'0
In addition:
It is well established that it is primarily the province of the municipal body to
determine the use and purpose to which property may be devoted, and it is neither
the province nor the duty of the courts to interfere with the discretion with which
such bodies are vested unless the legislative action of the municipality is shown to be
arbitrary, capricious or unrelated to the public health, safety and morals (emphasis
added). 10 6
Recent decisions, however, cast a cloud upon these accepted views.
Vigorous attacks have been launched upon "exclusionary zoning,"
which is in reality "snob zoning" that converts a suburb into a haven
of tranquil homes, free from the problems, for example, that apart-
ments bring. The latest view is that the zoning power is police
power exercised in behalf of the public of the entire state, and that
zoning that blocks the poor from access to the suburbs-either
through the medium of large-lot zoning or via the total exclusion of
apartments-is unconstitutional.' The question then is, has zon-
103. Id. at 640-41, 209 N.W. at 862.
104. Macchiarola, Local Government Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48 J. UR-
BAN L. 335, 357 (1971).
105. Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 493-94, 182 N.E.2d 219,
222-23 (1962).
106. La Salle Nat. Bank v. County of Cook, 12 Ill.2d 40, 46, 145 N.E.2d 65,
68 (1957).
107. Oakwood at Madison Inc. v. Twp. of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
353 (1971); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land &
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ing begun a swing back to the view that it is not simply a local affair?
That question remains unanswered.
Other Problems.
At this point, this paper has served its intended purpose. A
few narrow problems of property and municipal law have been
analyzed in the context of the new constitution, and judicial de-
terminations have been proffered. Much remains, of course, for
the courts to explore. 10 8
Up to this point, the discussion has drawn a distinction between
local affairs and state affairs. The existence in the constitution of
a provision for county home rule suggests the possibility that our
courts may discover a new category, that of "county affairs."' 9
There are matters that historically have fallen to the role of the
county, for example, that of maintaining a county recorder's office.
Should a home rule city appear to trench upon a matter traditionally
confided by the state to county governments, the possibility exists
that our courts may choose to approach this in terms of "county af-
fairs" versus "local affairs."
Such a result would not necessarily flow from the language of the
constitution, nor would it be confined to situations involving home
rule counties. Each state has created a diversity of public corpora-
tions and in turn each has been assigned a role by the state. A muni-
cipal home rule unit cannot establish its own recording office, for
the simple reason that recording is not a local affair." 0  Moreover,
Invest. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); 50 J. URBAN L. 129 (1972);
32 U. PiTr. L. REV. 83 (1972).
108. For example, sales of dedicated land present special problems. But see
City of Marysville v. Boyd, 181 Cal. App. 2d 755, 5 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1960), where
the court approached the problem in home rule terms.
109. Indeed, the existence of county home rule makes inevitable a clash over
state affairs as distinguished from county affairs, much as has occurred in the state
versus local affairs controversy. Glauberman, County Home Rule: An Urban Ne-
cessity, 1 URBAN L.R. 170, 185 (1969). Professor Baum thinks that potential con-
flicts between counties and home rule units will breed considerable litigation. Baum,
supra note 22, at 585.
110. Cralle v. City of Eureka, 136 Cal. App. 2d 808, 811, 289 P.2d 509, 511
(1955) where the court said: "Furthermore, to give an interpretation to the charter
section whereby it becomes a recording statute would extend the [Eurekal charter
beyond the regulation of municipal affairs. It would be to foster chaos to allow
cities to establish recording requirements in addition to those covered by state gen-
eral laws, the certainty required to expedite title searches would be impaired and
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even in the management of its local affairs, the home rule unit can-
not regulate other public bodies-like counties-for no express or
implied home rule power exists to regulate other public bodies.111
CONCLUSION
Dillon's Rule, first articulated in 1872, provided a dependable
bench-mark." 2 One looked at the state statutes, construed them,
and if the power assumed by the city was not granted by the legisla-
ture, it did not exist. Now this certainty has been replaced by un-
certainty. Few urban problems will lend themselves to the easy
solutions found to the problems here. Many court decisions will be
needed to resolve the new problems. These decisions unfortunately
are likely to be made in an atmosphere of controversy. There are
those who question the wisdom of municipal home rule. To some,
metropolitan government embracing the entire metropolitan com-
munity-as in the "unigovernment" of Marion County, Indiana-
seems more efficient."'1 Whether county home rule can fill the
present void seems doubtful. Existing loyalties are linked to the
municipality. No one says "I live in Cook County." He thinks of
himself as a resident of Evanston, Chicago, or Oak Park. Others
rendered more difficult and uncertain if each chartered [home rule] city were to
establish special recording laws. . . . We think the provisions of the Civil Code
relating to recording are matters of general state concern and not to be abrogated
or enlarged by a municipal charter. . . . Having held that the provision of the
charter relied upon, considered as a recording statute, is not one properly within the
realm of municipal affairs, we do not now agree with appellant's position. [em-
phasis added]
111. Wilson v. City of Medford, 107 Ore. 624, 643, 215 P. 184, 190 (1923),
where the Oregon Supreme Court stated: ". . . the city can as a part of its pre-
scribed procedure require the recording in the office of the county recorder of any
paper which it would, by force of state law, be the duty of that officer to record
if presented by any individual; but cities cannot in the exercise of the initiative
and under the guise of municipal legislation expand the duties of state or county
officers beyond the limits fixed by state laws: West Linn v. Tufts, 75 Ore. 304,
146 P. 986 (1915)." Professor Baum, in the absence of legislative history on this
point, speculates that home rule units may be able to regulate, within their bounda, ies,
the actions of special districts or authorities created by the state. Baum, supra note
22, at 587. But see Cuyahoga Met. Housing Auth. v. City of Cleveland, 342 F. Supp.
250, 257 (1972).
112. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237,
at 448-50 (5th ed. 1911).
113. Lugar, Decision-Making Allocation in Indianapolis, 1971 UTAH L. REV.
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view municipal government as largely archaic. They ask, for ex-
ample, why supplying water and other essential services should not
be deemed a function of state government." 4  The multiplicity of
municipal water bureaus, for example, each with its clerks, type-
writers, water bills, and water wells seems to them irrational and the
antithesis of efficient government. It was noted by the Illinois con-
stitutional convention delegates that Illinois has more governments
per thousand (1/1,600) than dentists (1/1,800), and that what
the layman or sociologist would refer to as "Chicago" comprises over
a thousand such units of government, including counties, cities,
towns, special service districts, school districts, unincorporated areas,
and parts of two states." '  The crying need to call a halt to spiral-
ing property tax bills speaks eloquently, some argue, for a new ap-
proach, as does the view that equal protection requires equality in
the provision of municipal services-a view that has not stopped with
schools, but has progressed to include street paving, street lighting,
sanitary sewers, water mains, fire hydrants, and even traffic control
signals."'
The flight to the suburbs, with the accompanying decay of the in-
ner city, seems, to some, to make rational home rule government im-
possible in most metropolitan areas, for the core-city tax collector
finds himself with less and less to tax while the need for greater rev-
enue grows daily." 7
Some fear that, as municipalities grapple with insoluble problems,
114. It has been suggested that essential services should be financed and ad-
ministered by the state and federal governments. Prof. Glenn W. Fisher of Wichita
State, reported in Chicago Daily News, April 28, 1972, at 5.
115. Report, Policy Recommendations for Constitutional Modernization, Com-
mission on Urban Area Government, 5 (1960). The population growth engenders
increasing state interest. Vanlandingham, supra note 1, at 314. Whether the
Illinois constitutional provision on intergovernmental cooperation (art. VII, § 10)
can offer partial solutions in this area remains to be seen. In California, Los An-
geles County has contracted to furnish cities almost all government services. GOVE,
THr LAKEWOOD PLAN (1961). The political problems are self-evident.
116. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (1971); See Comment, Equal Protection in the Ur-
ban Environment: The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 46 TUL. L. REV. 496
(1972).
117. Grant, Metropolitan Problems and Local Government Structure: An Ex-
amination of Old and New Issues, 22 VANDERBILT L. REV. 757 (1969). The prob-
lems are ably discussed in Moore, Local Government: Old Problems And A New
Constitution, 33 MONT. L. REV. 154 (1971).
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they will be tempted to wield the new tool of home rule like a meat
axe, all to no purpose, for the limitations on municipal power are in-
herent-like the forms of action, "they rule us from the grave."
Few problems are as simple as the problems we have discussed here.
The volume of litigation in this area will be significant indeed.
Editorial Note: Since this article was accepted for publication, the Supreme Court
has handed down its decision in Bridgman v. Korzen, No. 45290 (Sept., 1972).
It is clear from this opinion that the Supreme Court intends to review actions of
home iule units where the charge is made that such action does not fall within its
home rule powers. This disposes of one of the important problems discussed in the
article i.e., whether a home rule unit can pass an ordinance dealing with other than
municipal affairs and, whether the courts or only the legislature can decide when
a home rule unit is exercising powers beyond its authority.
In another as yet unreported Supreme Court decision, Kanellos v. County of
Cook, No. 44889 (May, 1972), the court apparently holds that prior procedural
statutory requirements, such as a referendum, are not binding on home rule units
legislating within their constitutional authority. This appears to make unnecessary
the precautions suggested in footnote 55.
Also, the Supreme Court has indicated it intends to resolve disputes between home-
rule counties and home-rule municipalities. City of Evanston v. County of Cook,
53 Ill.2d 312, rehearing denied Jan. 26, 1973. The dissent takes a step toward em-
bracing the doctrine of implied preemption. And in People ex rel. City of Salem
v. McMackin, 53 ll.2d 347, rehearing denied December 1, 1972, the court chose
to determine the extent of a city's home rule powers with respect to acquisition of
extraterritorial real estate.
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